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Abstract
Toronto’s Quayside waterfront regeneration project has become an international reference point for the burgeoning de-
bate about the scope and limits of the digitally enabled ‘smart city’ narrative. The project signals the entry of a Google
affiliate into the realm of ‘smart urbanism’ in themost dramatic fashion imaginable, by allowing them to potentially realise
their long-running dream for “someone to give us a city and put us in charge.” This article aims to understand this on-going
‘smart city’ experiment through an exploration of the ways in which ‘techno-centric’ narratives and proposed ‘disruptive’
urban innovations are being contested by the city’s civic society. To do this, the article traces the origins and evolution
of the partnership between Waterfront Toronto and Sidewalk Labs and identifies the key issues that have exercised local
critics of the plan, including the public/private balance of power, governance, and the planning process. Despite more
citizen-centric efforts, there remains a need for appropriate advocates to protect and promote the wider public interest
to moderate the tensions that exist between techno-centric and citizen-centric dimensions of smart cities.
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1. Introduction
The unprepossessing landscape of Toronto’s post-
industrial waterfront has become the unlikely setting
for what is arguably the boldest and most ambitious
‘smart city’ design ever to emerge in North America. Far
from being a purely local matter, the proposed regener-
ation of the Quayside area of the waterfront is already
a national and international reference point for the bur-
geoning debate about the scope and limits of the digi-
tally enabled ‘smart city’ narrative (Shieber, 2019; Skok,
2019; Wakefield, 2019; Won, 2018). Indeed, the debate
in Toronto embraces many of the themes that have sur-
faced elsewhere under the ‘smart city’ moniker, such
as techno-centric versus citizen-centric perspectives on
urban innovation (Cardullo & Kitchin, 2019), data gover-
nance issues around privacy and security (Kitchin, 2016;
van Zoonen, 2016), the extent to which ‘smart urban-
ism’ fosters or frustrates urban sustainability (Cugurollo,
2018; Haarstad, 2017), the integrity of the public sphere,
where governments are expected to exercise a duty of
care (Rodríguez Bolívar, 2016), and the role of profit-
seeking technology vendors that are marketing their
wares to city mayors as panaceas for a wide array of
urban planning problems (Viitanen & Kingston, 2014;
Wiig, 2015).
But why does a local regeneration project have
such global resonance? The main reason it resonates
is because of the corporate identity of the designer—
Sidewalk Labs (SL). SL is an affiliate of Google and both
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are subsidiaries of Alphabet, the parent company. The
Quayside project signals the entry of a Google affiliate
into the realm of ‘smart urbanism,’ as yet another ‘corpo-
rate storyteller’ (Söderström, Paasche, & Klauser, 2014),
in the most dramatic fashion imaginable. While most big
tech vendors are content to supply various combinations
of technology and services (McNeill, 2015), SL sees the
waterfront as an opportunity to engage in a unique place-
making experiment that would marry digital technology
with urban design and physical planning like never be-
fore (Pandey & Soto, 2019). This was evident from the
public announcement of the project, when Eric Schmidt,
Google’s former executive chair, said that the project
allowed them to realise their long-running dream for
“someone to give us a city and put us in charge” (Balsillie,
2018, para. 2).
The aim of this article is to analyse SL’s attempt to de-
velop and control the narrative behind this ‘smart city’
experiment and identify the extent to which the public
interest is employed by various actors within the plan-
ning process as a means of countering private interests.
It does this by first situating the Toronto case in the lit-
erature on ‘smart urbanism’ and the ‘public interest’ to
highlight the critical perspectives of urban scholars in
Section 2. Section 3 examines the origins and evolution
of the partnership between Waterfront Toronto and SL.
Section 4 identifies the key issues that have exercised
local critics of the plan, such as the public/private bal-
ance of power, the role of civil society, and the planning
process. Ultimately, we argue that despite more citizen-
centric efforts, there remains a need for appropriate ad-
vocates to protect and promote the wider public interest
as the smart city emerges as a means to moderate the
tensions that exist between techno-centric and citizen-
centric dimensions of smart cities.
2. Smart City Narratives: Critical Perspectives on Smart
Urbanism
Urban scholars have spent more than a decade debating
the nature of the ‘smart city’ andmany of them have con-
cluded that it is virtually impossible to understand it in
the abstract because it assumes somany diverse forms in
practice, prompting one scholar to call for ‘the real smart
city’ to stand up (Hollands, 2008). But the fact of the mat-
ter is that, given these manifold forms, there is no such
thing as the ‘real’ smart city. What we have instead is a
wide array of smart city narratives, many of which are
techno-centric narratives, with a growing minority con-
cerned to explore more sustainable or progressive nar-
ratives. Before addressing these thematic narratives we
need to appreciate what is arguably the most significant
aspect of all smart city narratives—namely the ‘smart’ dis-
course (Joss, Sengers, Schraven, Caprotti, & Dayot, 2019).
Consciously or not, the ‘smart city’ discourse frames
concepts, policies and investment strategies because it
informs and fashions the cognitive maps that constitute
dynamic, innovative and well-managed cities. Indeed,
some scholars now claim that the smart city can be con-
sidered a global discourse network (Joss et al., 2019).
This claim is based on a webometric analysis of ten
smart city dimensions that generated a cluster of more
than two dozen widely cited cities, a group that in-
cluded all the cities listed in the top ten smart cities on
the planet, namely Vienna, Toronto, Paris, NYC, London,
Tokyo, Berlin, Copenhagen, Hong Kong and Barcelona
(Cohen, 2012). The conclusions of the webometric analy-
sis were twofold. Firstly, that:
It is no coincidence that the 27 cities identified here
form the core of the global discourse network. As
(mostly) capital and world cities, backed by national
governments and promoted by international organi-
zations and business, they have evidently seized the
opportunity to place themselves at the heart of the
evolving smart city agenda, using it concurrently to
promote urban renewal to their domestic audiences
and to signal their global ambitions to foreign audi-
ences, and in doing so frequently engaging in mutual
cross-referencing. (Joss et al., 2019, p. 23)
Secondly, the authors detect a complex shift in the dis-
course regime as regards urban governance inasmuch
as it:
Entails calls for a disruptive (seen as positive) change
of society: references to outmoded twentieth-century
governance models, the need for fundamental trans-
formation, even a whole new way of thinking etc.,
together make clear the smart city’s ambition to
reach profoundly into the social realm. (Joss et al.,
2019, p. 23)
Although we can debate the merits of the webo-
metric methodology, these two conclusions deserve
to be taken seriously because (a) a group of promi-
nent cities are clearly being touted as beacons for
all other cities to emulate in the spurious name of
‘global best practice,’ and (b) the socially ‘disruptive’
ambitions of smart city discourse are far from being
wholly benign as we will see in Toronto. Already we
can identify examples of global interest by govern-
ment in smart cities, from the European Commission’s
Smart City Solutions (GrowSmarter, 2015), India’s Smart
City Mission (Ministry of Urban Development, 2017),
to the UK Future Cities Initiative (TSB, 2012), and the
United States’ Smart City Challenge (US Department
of Transportation, n.d.). Yet we can also detect where
the enthusiasm for these sorts of smart city initiatives
has resulted in more variegated impacts on the ground
where, business interests have been prioritised (Grossi &
Pianezzi, 2017), smart city governance has undermined
more local democratically elected bodies (Praharaj, Han,
& Hawken, 2018), and national programmes have em-
phasised external export opportunities rather than im-
provements to cities (Buck & While, 2017).
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At the core of most smart city narratives is a paean
to the formidable technical power of Information and
Communications Technologies (ICTs). Like all technolo-
gies, it is a technical power that has no pre-ordained so-
cial and spatial trajectory because it is contingent on how
and in whose interests it is deployed. But if the early de-
ployment of ICT is any guide, the impact of smart urban-
ism could be both socially and spatially uneven (Graham
& Marvin, 2001; Moss, 1987; Morgan, 1992). Because
long before smart city narratives emerged, urban schol-
ars likeMitchellMosswere among the first to explore the
implications of ICT for the spaces and flows of urban life.
In a celebrated analysis he correctly identified that the
diffusion of ICTs would lead not to the ‘end of agglom-
eration’ or the ‘death of distance’ as some technophiles
were predicting but, rather, to the bifurcation of space
as advanced business services were centralized in a few
principal world cities, “while simultaneously leading to
the dispersion of routine information-based activities to
the periphery of the metropolitan regions surrounding
the largest central cities” (Moss, 1987, pp. 534–546).
Notwithstanding these critical findings, the vast ma-
jority of smart city narratives have been so enthralled
by the technological possibilities of digitally-connected
urban infrastructures and data-driven services that they
constitute a form of techno-utopianism (Söderström
et al., 2014; Wiig, 2015). As these scholars have demon-
strated, this techno-centric discourse owes a great deal
to the highly successful marketing campaign that IBM
launched after 2008. Having developed its smart city
concept through consultancy work in Masdar City and
Rio de Janeiro, IBM sought to market the idea more
broadly through a challenge exercise, the Smarter Cities
Challenge. IBM announced the challenge in 2010 and
chose the first round of 24 cities later that year, though
the company was slow to realise that themain attraction
for the cities was as much IBM’s corporate imprimatur as
its smart city technology. When asked why cities applied
to the Smarter Cities Challenge, the IBM Director said:
[The Smarter Cities Challenge] generated huge inter-
est from cities all over the world, even though we
hadn’t really begun to explain what the business case
was for these things, what the return on investment
was going to be, how much money could we help you
save….It took us a long time to understand that what
was really driving this sort of thing is economic devel-
opment. (Wiig, 2015, p. 262; italics in original)
In other words, cities were using the IBM challenge as
a place-marketing exercise to signal to international in-
vestors that, despite the economic downturn, they re-
mained ‘open for business’ (Wiig, 2015).
If techno-centric narratives dominated the first wave
of smart city discourse, recent years have witnessed a
new wave of critical perspectives that aim to explore
more progressive citizen-centric narratives. Drawing on
the work of some of the early critics (e.g., Graham &
Marvin, 2001; Hollands, 2008), Vanolo summarises the
concerns of many critical scholars when he argued that
“the smart city discourse distances urban government
from politics and represents the urban question in terms
of the environment and technology, broadening the field
of action of technicians, consultants and private compa-
nies” (Vanolo, 2013, p. 883). Two dangers flow from such
a discourse. Firstly, the techno-centric discourse presents
itself as ‘natural’ and ‘univocal’ and effectively seeks to
de-politicize the urban planning agenda. Secondly, a sin-
gle techno-centric vision of the city of the future restricts
the horizon of any imaginative planning options, foreclos-
ing the debate about “alternative solutions to the prob-
lems of today and tomorrow” (Vanolo, 2013, p. 894).
The new wave of critical perspectives provides a be-
lated opportunity for robust debate about the scope and
limits of smart urbanism and its potential for fostering or
frustrating urban wellbeing. The critical scholars of this
new wave are addressing issues that have been elided
hitherto, like the need to overcome the tokenistic atti-
tude to citizen engagement in smart city narratives and
the necessity to give more prominence to ‘the place
of the public’ (Joss, 2018); the need to be more alive
to the ethical issues associated with the erosion of pri-
vacy through persistent and systemic mass surveillance
(Kitchen, 2019); the need to be more aware of the “anti-
planning” thrust of smart city experimentalism, which
threatens to undermine the normative values of tradi-
tional technologies of planning (Cowley&Caprotti, 2019)
and the need to confront the spurious nature of the
smart city’s credentials as regards social and environmen-
tal sustainability (Viitanen & Kingston, 2014). But criti-
cal scholars are also beginning to appreciate the need to
move beyond pure critique to explore the scope formore
progressive models of actually existing smart urbanism.
The positive case was well made recently by McFarlane
and Söderström, who issued the following political plea:
We need to engage in the analysis of the variegated
forms that ‘real’ SU [smart urbanism] takes on the
ground, both in the urban policies of national govern-
ments and municipalities, and in the grass-roots ini-
tiatives and social movements that disturb, resist or
create their versions of SU. (McFarlane & Söderström,
2017, p. 313)
Early smart city initiatives were rife with examples of cor-
porate domination and rhetoric (McNeill, 2015; Paroutis,
Bennett, & Heracleous, 2014; Söderström et al., 2014).
Many of these developments failed to prioritise local cit-
izen engagement as they sought to maximise the influ-
ence of their proprietary technologies within cities, such
as Rio de Janeiro’s smart city investments (Gaffney &
Robertson, 2018). As identified in Curitiba, Brazil, smart
city developments need to better engage with com-
munity and participatory forms of governance in or-
der to improve well-being (Macke, Casagrande, Sarate,
& Silva, 2018). Yet there are also later cases of smart
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city developments that have prioritised local community
engagement above wider corporate interests, such as
Newcastle, Australia, and in doing so achieve success
through the local institutionalisation of smart policies
and government ownership of infrastructure (Dowling,
McGuirk, & Maalsen, 2018). Similarly, Amsterdam has
sought to develop its smart city strategy through “an ap-
proach closely linked to strategic urban planning princi-
ples…based on strategic thinking, collaboration, and in-
clusive criteria” (Mora & Bolici, 2017, p. 261) designed
to ensure the broader public interest is served.
Planning has long justified its ability to intervene in
the built environment on the basis of acting in the pub-
lic interest (Alexander, 2002). While the profession has
often debated what is meant by the concept (Campbell
& Marshall, 2002; Murphy & Fox-Rogers, 2015), it is reg-
ularly invoked as a means of plan evaluation in prac-
tice (Alexander, 2002) and an ethical norm (Howe, 1994)
by planners. More broadly, concepts of the public inter-
est have extended to considerations of planning for jus-
tice (Basta, 2015; Fainstein, 2010; Schlosberg, 2013). This
idea of a universal public interest has however been con-
tested, particularly in relation to criticism of planning’s
technocratic rational comprehensive model and the
recognition of the plurality of interests inherent within
planning processes (Lindblom, 1959; Sandercock, 1998).
The rise of the entrepreneurial city in the 1990s pro-
vided further reflection for the planning profession on
the role of the public interest in practice (McGuirk &
MacLaran, 2001) and examination of the role of col-
laborative planning to address the local diversity of
voices present within communities (Healey, 1997).While
Healey argued that a ‘common’ public interest may no
longer exist due to a recognition of the heterogene-
ity of communities she still suggested that a public in-
terest which can “reflect the diversity of our interests”
(Healey, 1997, p. 297)was possible and important so long
as it was representative and discursive. Campbell and
Marshall (2002, pp. 181–182) however note that “given
the deep divisions of interest within society, the persis-
tence of disagreement and the prevalence of discord and
conflict it seems unlikely that a consensus can be discur-
sively constructed” and as such “argue that choices can-
not be left endlessly open.” In full recognition of the need
to try and represent the diversity of views, the state, and
planning’s central rolewithin it, therefore often attempts
to construct the public interest.
Drawing on a case study of Toronto’s Quayside de-
velopment we examine the process of plan-making by
SL and Waterfront Toronto in relation to the public in-
terest, both procedurally and substantively, through an
examination of an extensive array of corporate and gov-
ernment publications, media reports, and online discus-
sions in the public domain. Procedurally Alexander (2002,
p. 234) suggests the public interest can be “effectively
operationalized through socially adopted and legally en-
forced norms and rules of due process, sound admin-
istration, and reasonable decision-making.” While sub-
stantively plans may be assessed on the extent to which
they enhance “the welfare of all the parties affected by a
plan’s impacts” (Alexander, 2002, p. 238). Through the
lens of the public interest, we aim to explore the vari-
able disruptive effects emerging between techno-centric
narratives and citizen-centric narratives of smart urban-
ism and the role of planning in what we believe to
be the boldest smart city design ever proposed for a
North American city—the SL plan for the regeneration
of Toronto’s waterfront.
3. Positioning Toronto’s Smart City
Toronto’s rise towards one of North America’s largest
technology hubs has been rapid. A city of 2.9 million
people within a wider region of 5.9 million, CBRE, the
largest commercial real estate services company in the
world, proclaimed the city added twice as many new
technology jobs (22,500) as San Francisco (11,540) in
2017 (CBRE, 2018). This saw the city move from 12th
to 6th in the CBRE’s overall annual ranking. The most
recent 2019 ranking shifted the city even higher to 3rd
place behind the San Francisco Bay Area and Seattle.
Toronto’s 54% increase in total technology occupations
since 2013 was the fastest of all studied markets, nearly
matching the number of technology jobs generated in
the San Francisco Bay Area over the same period (CBRE,
2019). This boom in the technology sector saw many
in Toronto’s business community eagerly embrace a
Google affiliate company’s investment in the city, with
the Toronto Board of Trade announcing Daniel Doctoroff,
the CEO of SL, was to headline their annual dinner a
week after the initial selection of the company was
made while praising that SL involvement would bring
the “global spotlight to our waterfront, establishing it—
and Toronto—as a testbed for digital technology and ur-
ban innovation” (Toronto Board of Trade, 2017, p. 1).
Urban innovations were in high demand in Toronto as
its recent success brought with it a series of urban prob-
lems, making the city’s population potentially more sus-
ceptible to promises of digital solutions. Between 2006
and 2016 the city developed at a brisk pace, with a 9%
increase in population (Statistics Canada, 2006, 2016)
alongside a high-rise residential building boom that has
put pressure on city centre amenities and services (City
of Toronto, 2018). This increase in development coin-
cided with house prices doubling between 2011 and
2019 (Real Estate Bay Realty Inc, 2019), political debate
hindering investments in public transport (Walks, 2015),
and inequality becoming more polarised within the city
(Walks, Dinca-Panaitescu, & Simone, 2016). It was within
this environment that Waterfront Toronto sought a part-
ner to develop a 4.9 hectare site on the city’s industrial
waterfront and SL began to develop its narrative of digital
placemaking solutions for Toronto’s ills.
Waterfront Toronto (previously Toronto Waterfront
Revitalization Corporation until 2007) was established in
2002 as a tri-funded agency by the federal, provincial,
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and municipal governments to revitalise Toronto’s wa-
terfront. Its mission was to facilitate the development
of 1,149 hectares of private and public land in a coor-
dinated manner, which it has sought to operationalise
through a sustainability framework based on three pil-
lars of economic development, social growth, and envi-
ronmental protection (Bunce, 2009). The agency how-
ever lacks ownership and control over 99% of the land it
is tasked to revitalise, does not have expropriation pow-
ers, and does not have zoning or planning control powers
(OAG, 2018).Waterfront Toronto did howevermanage to
gain sole ownership over a 4.9 hectare site less than 2km
East of the downtown core known as ‘Quayside,’ a largely
vacant former industrial area. With this new-found op-
portunity and a new CEO, Will Fleissig, at the helm,
Waterfront Toronto issued a request-for-proposal (RFP)
in March 2017 for “an Innovation and Funding Partner
that…will help create and fund a globally-significant com-
munity that will showcase advanced technologies, build-
ing materials, sustainable practices and innovative busi-
ness models that demonstrate pragmatic solutions to-
ward climate positive urban development” (Waterfront
Toronto, 2017, p. 6). Alphabet’s subsidiary, SL, was the
successful bidder.
Will Fleissig, who stepped down in July 2018, re-
peatedly referred to SL as a “partner” and the plan for
Quayside as a “joint venture.” One local commentator
however argued that this was not the case, but in fact
that he was so mesmerised by SL’s smart city discourse
of disruption that:
In the name of speed and innovation, he blew off the
agency’s meticulously cultivated relationships with
themembers of the public who have been thoroughly
engaged with Waterfront Toronto’s work for almost a
generation. (Lorinc, 2018, para. 10)
Waterfront Toronto later admitted to communicating
and providing more information to SL and a few other
bidders compared to other parties prior to the issuing
of the RFP, and were additionally criticised by Ontario’s
Auditor General for the short six week time frame to
respond to the call compared to previous RFPs, for
not consulting with other levels of government prior
to signing an initial agreement with SL, as well as a
lack of time (a weekend) for the Board of Waterfront
Toronto to review the initial Framework Agreement
(OAG, 2018). Once signed, the scope of the project pro-
ceeded to rapidly evolve over 16 months, with the scale
of the project growing from 4.9 hectares to 77 hectares
to include proposals for two smart neighbourhoods
situated within a wider Innovative Development and
Economic Acceleration (IDEA) district (Figure 1). The pro-
posal initially envisioned the development of the original
Figure 1. Proposed SL IDEA district representing current site conditions. Proposed flood protection measures are not rep-
resented. Source: OpenStreetMap (openstreetmap.org) contributors under the Open Database Licence—CC BY-SA.
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Quayside site, comprising housing for 4,200 residents to
be followed by the redevelopment of a portion of Villiers
Island, to be called Villiers West. Villiers West would in-
clude housing for 2,700 people along with an estimated
7,400 jobs located within a 1.5 million square foot in-
novation campus for applied urban innovation research
which would include a new Google headquarters. To fa-
cilitate this development the “list of roles SL envisions
for itself [grew] to include: planning partner; real estate
research and development; real estate economic devel-
opment catalyst; infrastructure financing; horizontal de-
velopment partner; advanced infrastructure facilitator;
technology deployment; investments in economic devel-
opment, and value sharing” (Robinson & Coutts, 2019,
p. 339). The Ontario Auditor General’s Report ultimately
concluded that Waterfront Toronto’s “new agreement
with SL raises concerns in areas such as consumer pro-
tection, data collection, security, privacy, governance,
antitrust and ownership of intellectual property” (OAG,
2018, p. 649).
When SL’s draft Master Innovation and Development
Plan (MIDP) was published in June 2019, it laid out a
1,500 page vision for Quayside as well as the neigh-
bouring Villiers West district of the waterfront (Sidewalk
Toronto, 2019). The MIDP includes a raft of proposals
designed to pilot new technology and building meth-
ods, including the use of timber for high-rise construc-
tion, adaptable ‘loft’ spaces with flexible wall panels,
clean thermal grid, smart underground disposal sys-
tem for waste, weather-adaptable buildings, new mobil-
ity services, and modular pavement systems, to name
a few—all managed through a series of sensors inte-
grated throughout the development (Sidewalk Toronto,
2019). Spread over three volumes (The Plans, The Urban
Innovations, and The Partnership) it outlines three key
ideas as distilled by Waterfront Toronto which produced
a ‘Note to Reader’ to aid the public in understanding the
extensive proposal, as no executive summary was pro-
vided by SL (Waterfront Toronto, 2019a). The first relates
to the proposed expansion of the project through the cre-
ation of the IDEA District spanning 77 hectares that SL
argued was necessary to meet Waterfront Toronto’s re-
quired priority outcomes. The proposed district would
be overseen by a public administrator who reports to
Government, an innovation framework that would allow
for necessary regulatory and legal changes as well as de-
sign innovations, and the provision of a range of finan-
cial tools to help fund infrastructure. Secondly, four roles
are proposed for SL: Lead real estate and advanced in-
frastructure developer for Quayside and adjacent Villiers
West; Chief advisor on incremental changes to technical
and regulatory innovation and design standards as the
project develops; the delivery of new technological so-
lutions; and an optional role in financing local and ad-
vanced infrastructure and a new light rail line jointly with
the different levels of government. Finally, a financial
structure for the development is included in relation to
real estate, infrastructure, and intellectual property. The
process leading up to the MIDP’s creation and subse-
quent proposals were however met with varied levels of
suspicion, to which we now turn.
4. Disrupting the (Smart) City Narrative
4.1. From Public to Private Interest on the Waterfront
Since its inception,Waterfront Toronto’s lack of key finan-
cial and legal powers saw it focus on facilitation, consul-
tation, and strategic planning through the establishment
of relationshipswith awide array of Toronto stakeholders
(Bellas & Oliver, 2016). Despite this long history of open-
ness, Waterfront Toronto behaved in an extraordinarily
secretive manner in its early dealings with SL when Will
Fleissig was the CEO. For example, Goodman and Powles
(2019) note:
• Agreements between Waterfront Toronto and SL
were kept private and not subject to freedom of in-
formation requests, with the original terms of the
partnership kept hidden from the public eye for
nine and-a-half months. Additionally, the terms of
the MIDP were kept largely secret until they were
announced in July 2019;
• Public engagement exercises were often managed
by SL, lacking specifics and accountability to the
public;
• Despite the resignations of high-profile advisors to
the project and public opposition, there were no
identifiable reflections or alterations to plans and
processes.
The secretive nature of the planning process and the def-
erential disposition of Waterfront Toronto to SL is all the
more difficult to fathom given the scale of resources that
the public sector was committing to the project. SL had
made no secret of the fact that it had no interest in the
project unless public funding was made available to in-
vest in flood protection infrastructure and in a light rail
network (Deschamps, 2019; Sauter, 2018). Government
had already committed CAD$1.25 billion to the former,
while the latter project remains to be worked out, with
SL’s CEO proclaiming that “at the end of the day, if there
is no light rail through the project, then the project is
not interesting to us” (Deschamps, 2019, p. 1). Doctoroff
made the claim following criticism of leaked documents
from SL that suggested the company could help to fi-
nance the light rail project if the city was willing to pro-
vide a portion of property taxes, development fees and
increased land value stemming from the development to
SL (Oved, 2019).
Aside from the issue of public funds, arguably the
most important concern of all has been the poten-
tial privatisation of personal data collected as part of
the project. Criticism has come from multiple angles,
with the MIDP being criticised by Waterfront Toronto’s
arms-length Digital Strategy Advisory Panel, made up
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of experts from academia, industry, the civic technol-
ogy community and law, who argued that the issue
of data governance should not be decided by SL but
rather “the development of data governance for this
project—including assessment of whether a data trust
is an appropriate vehicle—should, going forward, be
led by Waterfront Toronto and its government partners”
(Waterfront Toronto’s Digital Strategy Advisory Panel,
2019, p. 24). One of the most prominent and tenacious
critics of the SL proposals for data governance has been
Bianca Wylie, who argues that the rules and regula-
tions of public governance need to catch up with big
tech practice because they were fashioned in the pre-
internet era (Bliss, 2018). She also challenged the under-
lying narrative of the whole project, saying: “Let’s take
a minute here to stop and reframe the narrative. This is
not an urban planning project, it’s a technology project.
As for a technology project, the biggest issue is not pri-
vacy, it’s governance” (Wylie, 2018, paras. 18–19). Re-
asserting the role of public governance is not easy when
all three levels of government—at city, provincial and
federal level—have been enthusiastic advocates of the
partnership with SL. To date therefore the main public
critics of the project have come from the realm of urban
civil society.
4.2. Civil Society Reactions
Scholars have argued that public governance is under
threat in Toronto from a combination of privatisation
(of personal data and intellectual property), domination
(through rights-of-way and tech interfaces), and plat-
formization (where the city becomes beholden to SL’s
private platform; see Goodman & Powles, 2019). These
themes are echoed within the city’s civil society where
reactions to SL’s plans have been triggered at two lev-
els, locally and nationally. At the local level one of the
main organised reactions has been the formation of
BlockSidewalk, which it says is a campaign to develop
Toronto’s waterfront for the benefit of Torontonians,
not corporate shareholders. The civil group called on
Waterfront Toronto to reject a business deal with SL, and
reset the planning for Toronto’s eastern waterfront, “this
time with planning, procurement and consultation re-
maining firmly in public hands” (Blocksidewalk.ca, 2019,
para. 1).
At the national level the Canadian Civil Liberties
Association (CCLA) is suing the three levels of govern-
ment that collectively control Waterfront Toronto to
halt the potential privatisation of personal data. In an
open letter to the Federal, Ontario, and Toronto gov-
ernments, the CCLA said that Sidewalk Toronto and the
Quayside project should be reset, until all three lev-
els of government, after adequate public consultation,
have established:
Digital data governance policies for the appropriate
collection, ownership, use and residency of personal
information and other data obtained from public
places in any embedded sensor laden, data harvesting
Smart City contemplated for Quayside. (CCLA, 2019,
para. 3)
In contrast, the Toronto Region Board of Trade claims
that there is popular support for the SL plan because, in
a poll it commissioned, 55% of residents supported the
Quayside project and 76% believed that it should pro-
ceed “if the public interest can be safeguarded as the
process unfolds” (Wray, 2019, para. 3).
However, these differences are ultimately resolved, it
is clear that Toronto has acquired an international repu-
tation for hosting a smart city model that is top-down
and tech-driven, a model that is being compared un-
favourably with other cities. In Barcelona, for example,
the city government is pioneering a citizen-centric de-
sign, asserting citizens’ ‘digital sovereignty’ by empha-
sizing civic participation, social impact and public return
(March & Ribera-Fumaz, 2018). Its chief technology offi-
cer was keen to contrast Barcelona’s approach to apply-
ing technology to solve existing everyday problems ver-
sus SL technology first mindset (Thornhill, 2019).
Scholars are also comparing the two cities with re-
spect to the ethics of smart city design. As Rob Kitchen
has argued: “Whereas Toronto appears to treat ethics in
a procedural way, the Barcelona Digital City Initiative is
designed to be open, inclusive, and participatory in prac-
tice and ambition” (Kitchen, 2019, para. 5). He goes on
to argue that Barcelona’s approach aims to push back
against themarketisation of local infrastructure, services,
and data while seeking to re-define smart cities as places
founded on transparency, rights, and community. This
leads us to now consider the role of the planner in the
development of Toronto’s smart city.
4.3. What Role for the Urban Planner?
As the SL project has developed there has been a distinct
lack of involvement by urban planners, at least publicly.
The MIDP broadly aligns to and builds on a wide range
of planning strategies that have already been produced,
such as the city’s TOcore Building for Liveability (City
of Toronto, 2018), Complete Streets Guidelines (City of
Toronto, 2019), and guidelines around privately-owned
publicly accessible spaces (City of Toronto, 2014) as well
asWaterfront Toronto targets for affordable housing pro-
vision. The Quayside and Villiers West neighbourhoods
are covered by two city approved precinct plans, the
‘East Bayfront’ and the ‘Keating Channel.’ Both plans in-
volved extensive engagement with key stakeholders, res-
idents, businesses, the city and associated agencies over
several years (Waterfront Toronto, 2005, 2010). While it
is common for precinct plans to evolve and becomemore
concrete as individual projects develop, our preceding
discussion highlights a number of concerns regarding the
lack of engagementwithWaterfront Toronto’s Board, the
City of Toronto, its associated agencies such as the public
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transportation provider, nearby residents, surrounding
land owners, and businesses. SL and Waterfront Toronto
both view theMIDP as a draft which is intended to evolve
following further consultation.
Based on an assessment by Waterfront Toronto
(2019a), theMIDP generally conforms to the two existing
precinct plans in relation to the provision of community
facilities, connectivity, and role of the main arterial right-
of-way running through the site. TheMIDP diverges from
the two precinct plans by proposing lower levels of den-
sity, building height, and on-site parking but higher lev-
els of non-residential uses as well as differences in pro-
posed building mass and built form. Overall, the ‘plan’
components of the MIDP align to the planning principles
established in the two precinct plans but the focus of
the plan heavily favours proposed ‘techno-centric’ inno-
vations such as noise and air quality nuisance monitor-
ing, active stormwater management, smart pavements,
and autonomous vehicles all of which rely on a variety
of sensors to capture and then process data in real-time
(Sidewalk Toronto, 2019). Unsurprisingly, it is the data
collection and monitoring proposals that have been the
most controversial in the public eye. In response to crit-
icism about who would have access to neighbourhood
generated data, SL proposed the creation an indepen-
dent Urban Data Trust to manage access. But the pro-
posal continued to raise concerns, with critics arguing
that SL should not be the ones directing the creation
of the trust and the Ontario Information and Privacy
Commissioner noting in an open letter to Waterfront
Toronto that current proposals have “a lack of inde-
pendent public oversight, a cumbersome mandate that
overlaps with that of my office and the federal Privacy
Commissioner, and an insufficient role for the City given
its experience delivering 10municipal services in the pub-
lic interest” (OIPC, 2019, pp. 9–10).
Applying a procedural view of the public interest to
SL planning process to date, there is much lacking. From
March 2017 to October 2019, the techno-utopianism
(Söderström et al., 2014;Wiig, 2015) narrative in Toronto
has seen SL as the inevitable victor in the bidding pro-
cess, a limited engagement with stakeholders, an over-
reaching in terms of scope of the plan, and lead architect
of proposed new institutions of governance. Filling the
governance void, Toronto’s civil society sought to push
back and argue for the public interest via a citizen-centric
narrative advocating for data protection, civil rights, and
enhanced governance mechanisms. Usually quite visible
during the re-development of neighbourhoods the tradi-
tional roles of the planner during this period have been
superseded by data scientists, public relations officers,
businesses, and civic society in the SL public debate.
Substantively, SL proposed urban innovations include
a number of laudable goals, but too often the emphasis
is placed on the technological innovation rather than a
careful examination of the outcome of the intervention.
Here too planners were largely absent in the public de-
bate about the merits of the urban innovations and the
impact they might have on those who will live and en-
gage with the proposed neighbourhood. Beyond issues
of data privacy, there are wider concerns to which plan-
ners may yet lend their voices at the formative stages of
plan evaluation, including the impact on disadvantaged
members of the community, cost-effectiveness, political
acceptability, and viability. The future suggests planners
may however have a stronger role.
At the end of October 2019 Waterfront Toronto is-
sued its response to the MIDP and subsequent agree-
ment with SL. In a two-page open-letter Waterfront
Toronto Chair Steven Diamond provided a harsh re-
buke of key aspects of the proposals, stating “concerns
were rooted in our public interest mandate” (Waterfront
Toronto, 2019b, para. 6). This led to an agreement with
SL that saw the amount of land reduced back down to
the original 4.9 hectares, elimination of the Urban Data
Trust proposal, decline of SL request for new governance
mechanisms, reversal of SL from lead developer to part-
ner, no requirement for a LRT-line as a precondition, ex-
pansion of patent rights for Canadian companies, and en-
titlement of Waterfront Toronto to a share of intellec-
tual property based on the percentage of revenues as
opposed to profits. Also agreed was the creation of a
public agency to house data gathered from the project
and acknowledgement that ‘digital proposals’ may be re-
viewed through publicmeetings and require government
approvals (Waterfront Toronto, 2019c). On this last point
city planners may yet play a key role in constructing and
then protecting the ‘public interest’ as the process shifts
from broad debates on governance to the details of by-
laws, policy, legislation and process.
5. Conclusion
While acknowledging the contested nature of the con-
cept of the public interest, engagement by planners in
the public debate about the procedural and substantive
public interest dimensions of the proposed SL plan have
to date been limited. Instead, Toronto’s rise as a tech-
nology hub on the global stage initially shifted the focus
away from the public interest and towards the corporate
ideals of smart urbanism,with less public attention being
paid to the traditional planning components of the plan.
The very public clash between corporate and civil society
on Toronto’s waterfront risked a winner-take-all battle
for the future smart city. Given the capitulation of SL to
Waterfront Toronto’s demands it appears citizen-centric
narratives of the smart city have won the first round.
The general lack of direct engagement by planners in
the smart city debate however suggests a need for cities
to fashion new multi-disciplinary teams in which urban
planning functions are blended with digital innovation
functions and data analytics expertise so that planning
is reimagined for the digital era. Lessons from the pre-
ceding case study also suggests there is a need to fur-
ther explore the ways in which municipal activism and
civic engagement are harnessed in smart city debates to
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advocate for the public interest. While future research
should focus on the multi-scalar nature of planning pol-
icy to understand how local plans are aligned with and
supported by national regulations on data privacy and
data governance.
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